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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
visions of the Uniform Act. To retain the desired uniformity, future
legislators must watch with care their drafting of acts involving ad-
ministrative agencies to be certain that such inconsistencies do not
occur.'
Myron Atkinson, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY-EXCEPTING JUDGMENT CLAIM FROM DIS-
CHARGE-EFFECT OF LACHES. The debtor filed a voluntary peti-
tion in bankruptcy in the Eastern District of New York, and the cred-
itor filed the only claim scheduled. The proceedings were subse-
quently dismissed. Although dismissal is equivalent to denial,1 three
years later the debtor again filed a voluntary petition in the Southern
District of New York, listing the same claim. The court, unaware it
was acting upon a non-dischargeable debt, granted a general dis-
charge. Twelve years thereafter the claim was assigned to petitioner,
who now seeks to have the court exempt the claim from the operation
of the discharge granted in the second proceeding. Held: petition
granted. The denial of the first discharge, for whatever reason, is res
judicata, not to be questioned in a later proceeding. Laches does not
bar the claim, and the court may correct its order at any time since
it has been imposed upon. Harris v. Warshawsky, 184 F.2d 660 (2d
Cir. 1950).
The instant case represents the view of the bankruptcy-experienced
Second Circuit. However, the court's liberality in recognizing a claim
where the claimant obviously had been guilty of laches, is opposed by
respectable authority. One eminent bankruptcy scholar argues that
"there must come a time when the discharge is irrevocable. An in-
terested party should not be entitled to stand by indefinitely until it
seems advantageous to present the defense of res judicata". Under
the doctrine of res judicata the bankruptcy courts have broadened
the scope of debts which are non-dischargeable beyond those set
forth in section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. The pendency of a volun-
tary petition in bankruptcy,' the denial of a discharge in a prior pro-
ceeding,4 the dismissal of the prior proceeding without the granting
of a discharge,' or the failure to apply for a discharge' precludes con-
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sideration of 'a second petition for a discharge of the same debts. The
res judicata principle-that a debt once branded non-dischargeable
must be so recognized in a later proceeding-is lucidly explained in
In re Feigenbaum.' It is there stated that "a proceeding in bankruptcy
is in the nature of a bill in equity where the bankrupt is the com-
plainant and the creditors are the defendants. Where a discharge is
denied on the merits, the judgment inures to the benefit of all the
creditors. All parties to the proceedings are bound by it and none of
them should be permitted to try the same question again; it is res
judicata." As such it is binding on the parties involved.'
Clearly a bankruptcy court has the power to reopen a closed estate
and vacate or amend its orders when equitable grounds are shown.'
The court may do so on its own motion, taking judicial notice of the
records of the earlier proceedings"0 in order to protect creditors.'
However, there is a split of authority as to whether the creditor's
laches should -prevent the exception of his claim from the discharge.
The Second Circuit has allowed a claim as ripe as fifteen years to
be excepted." Other jurisdictions have regarded laches as a valid
defense to the motion."3
In these cases section 15 of the Bankruptcy Act imposing a one year
limitation on revoking a discharge for the fraud of the bankrupt is
not deemed applicable since the creditor moves to amend rather than
revoke the order." Particularly where the bankrupt abused the pro-
cess of the court in failing to have the non-dischargeable claim ex-
cepted from the discharge,' there is valid argument in support of the
result in the instant case. To hold otherwise, according to Judge Clark,
would make the later proceeding ". . . a real boon to a debtor assid-
uous in bankruptcies if not in payments to his creditors."'"
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It is submitted that social policy would be served better if the
second discharge had been given effect. Under the spirit of the Bank-
ruptcy Act some definite end to litigation must arrive. To hold other-
wise may cause undue hardship on former bankrupts who have begun




CIPAL CORPORATIONS-MILK ORDINANCES-VALIDITY. An or-
dinance of Madison, Wisconsin, prohibited the sale of milk (a) collect-
ed from farms located more than 25 miles, or (b) pasteurized at
plants located more than 5 miles, from the central square of the city.
Plaintiff Dean Milk Company, an Illinois corporation, applied for but
was denied a license to sell its milk in Madison, solely because its
sources and pasteurization plants were located in northern Illinois
beyond the limits prescribed by the ordinance. Pointing out that its
milk is inspected and rated "Grade A" by both Chicago and United
States Public Health inspectors, the Dean Milk Company contended
that both sections of the Madison ordinance violate the. Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States, three justices dissenting,
held that the challenged sections impose an undue burden upon in-
terstate commerce and are therefore unconstitutional. Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison, 71 Sup. Ct. 295 (1951). "In thus erecting an econ-
omic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition
from without the state, Madison plainly discriminates against inter-
state commerce."1
The Court objected not to the purppse of the ordinance-to obviate
health dangers created by sale of milk from remote areas-but rather
to the means by which the city hoped to achieve its purpose. Both
the Madison Health Commissioner and the sanitarian of the Wisconsin
State Board of Health agreed that there were other workable alterna-
tives, and the Court, in dictum, declared these preferable to the Madi-
son ordinance. First, the city could accomplish satisfactory inspection
of milk from outlying pasteurization plants by having its own offi-
cials conduct inspections and by charging "the actual and reasonable
cost of such inspection to the importing producers and processors."'
Second, the city could adopt a milk regulatory program based on sec-
tion 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance recommended by the United
States Public Health Service, which in effect permits sale of milk
from other localities whose inspection standards are equivalent.!
1 Id. at 298.
Id. at 298.
Section 11 of the Model Milk Ordinance recommended by the United
States Public Health Service reads, in part, as follows: "Milk and milk
products from points beyond the limits of routine inspection of the city
of .. . . may not be sold in the city of . . . or its police jurisdiction,
unless produced and/or pasteurized under provisions equivalent to the
requirements of this ordinance; provided that the health officer shall sat-
isfy himself that the health officer having jurisdiction over the production
and pricessing is properly enforcing such provisions."
